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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (d), 
1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and fine against 
defendant for unsafe left turn. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The court's negligence in observing an accurate reproduction 
of accident scene, as conceded by the city's witness (Officer 
Nelson) in trial testimony, constitutes prejudice. 
2. That supporting testimony from city's witness and defendant 
demonstrate a violation of City Code and contributory negligence 
by city's witness, to wit Nancy Borg. 
3. That the court's acknowledgement of city's witness' (Nancy 
Borg's) vehicle being unsafe toward defendant's identifies a 
breach of code which should be grounds for acquittal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The determinative provision in this matter is 12.44.210, 
Salt Lake City Code Annotated. This statute is reproduced 
verbatim in the addendum. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff 
Salt Lake City and against Defendant Richard R. J. Uaugh entered 
1 
after a bench trial before circuit court judge Maurice D. Jones. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The defendant was convicted by judge's verdict on March 26, 
1990 of the offense of unsafe left turn. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The defendant was found guilty of traffic violation of 
unsafe left turn and ordered to pay fine of $75.00. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 9, 1990 at 11:50 am defendant was driving a 
truck/semi trailer west on 200 South and turning south on 
500 West when he observed an Oldsmobile sedan facing north 
behind the stop sign on 500 West but to the left of center of 
roadway. Defendant's turn was subsequently adjusted for the 
reduced amount of space left to negotiate it. A collision 
ensued between the car and the left rear wheels of the trailer, 
carrying the car a distance in the direction of travel of the 
trailer. 
Both vehicles thereafter remained motionless awaiting the 
reporting officer who immediately spray painted the street 
adjacent to the position (vlocation) of each vehicle's tires. 
This procedure located the car beyond the stop sign into the 
crosswalk, with the actual point of impact (derived from skid-
marks from the car) being even further into the intersection, 
as noted by the reporting officer. 
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At the intersection of 200 South and 500 West, the right-
of-way is with 200 South (with defendant); with 500 West (Nancy 
Borg) controlled by a stop sign from which one block west can be 
viewed and a distance of two blocks east can be viewed. An 
intersection drawing from the Salt Lake City Transportation 
Engineering Office, with the spray marks superimposed over it, 
was prepared for trial court. The reporting officer under oath 
recognized the rendering as the accident scene as he found it. 
Several issues were determined at the trial and acknowledged 
by both Salt Lake City and defendant. Those being: 1. That the 
car was behind the stop sign when the truck commenced the turn 
through the intersection, 2. That by the time the truck cab had 
passed the car, the vehicle had proceeded into the intersection 
where it was found by the reporting officer. 
Salt Lake City Code Book dated 11-89 Title 12 Chapter 
12.44.210 "Entering through Streets or Stop Intersections," 
under Article III "Right of Way and Yielding," letter D states 
that ffIn the event that a driver, after having driven past a 
stop sign, is involved with...a vehicle having right-of-way in 
the intersection, such collision shall be deemed prima facia 
evidence of such driver's failure to yield the right-of-way as 
required by this section...11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Insufficient evidence to support a conviction of defendant 
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for unsafe left turn, with evidence to the contrary demonstrating 
failure to yield by city's witness, to wit Nancy Borg. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The following are the points of fact as found in trial 
transcript, with relative codes, definitions, and supporting case 
identifying those findings. 
1. Nancy Borg indicated she was stopped at stop sign when 
defendant commenced his turn (pg 3 lines 8, 25; pg 4 line 19). 
2. Defendant corraborated that (pg 12 lines 22,23). 
3. Police officer Nelson states that Nancy Borg's car was 
beyond, or forward of, the stop sign after the impact (pg 22 
lines 1, 2, 16, 18). He further states that her car, at the 
time of impact, was even further north (or further into the 
intersection) (pg 22 lines 12, 14), Officer Nelson then clarifies 
that Ms. Borg probably made her stop at the sign, as had been 
universally agreed, then proceeded to a point further into the 
intersection to stop again Qpg 23 lines 4, 5). The officer at 
this point states that Ms. Borg is exempt from reasonable and 
prudent actions Cpg 23 line 10). 
4. Defendant contended that Ms. Borg proceeded from her 
original stop into the intersection for her subsequent stop 
after defendant's cab (tractor) had passed her in the course of 
his turn and he could no longer see her (pg 14 line 25; pg L5 
lines 1, 2, 3). [Martin v. Stevens 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 750 
(right-of-way need not anticipate outbursts of another's 
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negligence)J (See addendum for complete finding.) 
5. Even though Officer Nelson observed the accuracy of my 
reproduction of accident scene (pg 21 lines 5, 6, 22, 23, 24, 
25; pg 22 lines 1, 2), Judge Jones refused with a shake of his 
head and a deference to attorney Ludlow to look at it p^g 11 
lines 23, 24)... and did not through the course of the trial 
see said reproduction. In the sense that in the absence of the 
court viewing an accurate reproduction of the accident scene, 
there is reasonable likeliness that there would have been a 
contrary result had the court viewed it; prejudice is thereby 
defined. 
6. Because Judge Jones had no accurate reference to accident 
scene, he exhibited a misconception of facts stated in the 
trial as to the distance the car was beyond the stop sign at 
the time of impact. Judge Jones said, ,la foot or two," when in 
reality it was l%-2 car lengths (see reproduction of accident 
scene in addendum; see trial transcript pg 21 lines 5, 6, 22, 
23, 24, 25; pg 22 lines 1, 2). The car was found to be 5-6f 
beyond the stop sign after the accident and Officer Nelson 
states that it was beyond that at the time of the impact (pg 22 
lines 12, 14;. 
7. Judge Jones finally states that Ms. Borg was "absolutely 
safe for all traffic except11 trucks (pg 29 lines 4, 5). Yet in 
Salt Lake City Code Chapter 12.44 Article III "Right of Way and 
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Yielding" section 12.44.210 paragraph D says on pg 441, ff...a 
vehicle having right-of-way..." Furthermore, the definition of 
vehicle, City Code 12.04.610 pg 413 states,f"vehicle" means 
every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or 
may be transported or drawn upon a highway...' (See addendum 
for complete definition.) 
Because the Judge exempts the city's witness from being 
safe toward truck traffic with right-of-way (pg 29 lines 4, 5) 
by his verdict, he again demonstrates bias against trucks 
being equal under law to cars. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the defendant/appellant was convicted of this 
offense by a Judge's verdict in spite of the preponderance o£ 
trial testimony to the contrary, with none supporting the 
plaintiff, the circuit court's decision should be reversed, 
the fine should be refunded, and relief of reasonable cost 
of defense awarded to defendant. 
Dated this 11th day of October, 1990. 
Richard Waugh Pro Se 
Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing brief by depositing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Salt Lake City Prosecutors Office 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 11th day of October, 1990. 
Richard Waugh 
Defendant/Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Salt Lake City Code Annotated, 1989 
12.44.210 Entering through streets or stop intersections. 
D. In the event that a driver, after having drivenpast a 
stop sign, is involved in a collision with a pedestrian having 
right-of-way in a crosswalk or a vehicle having right-of-way 
in the intersection such collision shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence of such driver's failure to yield the right-of-way 
as required by this section, but shall not be considered neg-
ligence per se. (Prior code Title 46, Art. 12 S 204) 
Salt Lake City Code Annotated, 1989 
12.04.610 Vehicle. 
"Vehicle11 means eyery device in, upon or by which any person 
or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, 
except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon 
stationary rails or tracks. (Prior code Title 46, Art 1 vS 58) 
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MARTIN v. 
Cite us - ^ 
M A R T I N v. S T E V E N S . 
No. 7731. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
May 1, V.CVi. 
Action by Lynn XV. Martin against Paul 
JT. Stevens fur damages arising out of colli-
Q;i>!i at iutt'i-scct ion l.otwoeu automobile of 
j.lMinlifi' and that of defendant. The Third 
judh 0:1 10>friet Tourf. Salt Lake County. 
V. II. Kllett. J., granted <lelVn<lani\s motion 
ft,r dismissal at close of plaintiffs evidence 
..ml plaintiff appealed. Tin* Supremo Coiirr, 
rro<'U«'tt. .1., held that u'hoihor plaintiff had 
}„.c!i guilty of cont rih'itory m^liirenee in u«>t 
_ cin.L: and avoidinir eHVets of Oofemlaiu's 
.p-Lrli^ouce. ami if so, whether such failure 
• viis proximate cause of collision, were ques-
tions for jury. 
Cause reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error C=>927(3) 
On appeal from dismissal of plaintiff's 
action at close of plaintiff's evidence, plain-
tiff is entitled to have review by appellate 
court of all the evidence, together with 
rverv logical inference most favorable to 
plaintiff, which might fairly be drawn there-
from. Rules of Civil Procedure , rule 41(b) . 
2. Automobiles 0=245(14, 44) 
In action for personal injuries to plain-
tiff when his automobile was struck by that 
,,f defendant at intersection, at which there 
was no stop sign regulat ing traffic, wherein 
:t appeared that plaintiff was virtually 
topped at time his automobile was hit in 
-ide by that of defendant, and testimony 
:::dicated that defendant was going more 
•han 32 miles per hour in 25 mile per 
r.our zone, evidence was sufficient to war-
r.t::t submission to ju ry of issue of de-
f'Tidant's negligence concerning speed, 
look-out, and defendant 's duty to keep his 
-immobile under safe control and on his 
*xe of street. 
3. Negligence <S=>I36(9, 31) 
The question of contr ibutory negli-
•.:'-:ice is usually for jury , and before such 
STEVENS Utah 747 
•: L'.'id i t : 
issue may be taken from jury, defendant 's 
burden of proving both that plaintiff was 
guilty of contr ibutory negligence, and that 
such negligence proximately contributed 
to cause his own injury must be met and 
established with such cer tainty that reason-
able minds could not find to contrary, and 
if there is any reasonable basis upon which 
reasonable minds might conclude that they 
are not convinced ei ther that plaintiff was 
guilty of contr ibutory negligence or that 
such negligence proximately contributed to 
cause injury, plaintiff is entitled to have 
question submitted to j u ry . 1 
4. Automobiles 171(4) 
When vehicles are approaching and are 
about to enter intersection at substantially 
the same time, dr iver approaching from 
r ight has right of way over one approach-
ing from his left, but when one of such 
vehicles reaches intersection prior to other, 
without hav ing accelerated for such pur-
pose, such motoris t who first enters inter-
section has r ight of way over second, un-
less s tandard of due care precludes him 
from proceeding because to do so would 
hazard collision. 
5. Automobiles <O208 
Motoris t who entered intersection prior 
to defendant and from his r ight had right 
of way. 
6. Automobiles C=>2Q8 
Rule under which motoris t is held 
guilty of contr ibutory negligence as matter 
of law for failing to observe and avoid 
collision at intersect ion with oncoming 
dr iver under circumstances where other 
d r ive r may have been, or was guilty o{ 
negligence in his approach, does not pur-
port to lay down s tandard other than that 
of ord inary and reasonable care under cir-
cumstances. 2 
7. Automobiles C=>206, 208 
Motoris t who has r ight of way at in-
tersect ion may not claim r ight of way in 
face of danger which one exercising due 
Ni.-lson v. Mauchley. Utah, 202 P.2d 
"17: Toomcr's Estate v. Union Pacific 
I^u'lroad Co.. Utah. 2.30 P.2d 103. 
I'.ullof-k v. Luke. 08 Utah 501, 08 P.2d 
•'-"'•'. .354; Sine v. Salt Lake Transporta-
tion Co., 100 Utah, 280. 147 P.2d 875; 
Iliekok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 100 P.2d 
514; Conklin v. Walsh. 11.3 Utah 270. 10.3 
P.2d 437; Gren v. Norton, Utah, 213 P. 
2d 350. 
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care would see and avoid, but motorist is 
not bound to anticipate that other driver 
would fail to accord him his right of way, 
uncil in exercise of due care, he observes, 
or should observe, something to warn him 
that other driver is driving negligentl) or 
will fail to accord right of way.3 
8. Automobiles 0245(80) 
In action for personal injuries to plain-
tiff when his automobile was struck by 
that of defendant at intersection at which 
he had right of way, wherein it was con-
tended that plaintiff was contributory 
negligent as matter of law in not seeing and 
avoiding effects of defendant's negligence, 
issue whether plaintiff had exercised due 
care for his own safety was for jury. 
9. Automobiles 0^245(50) 
In action for personal injuries to plain-
tiff when his automobile was struck at 
intersection at which he had right of way 
by that of defendant, wherein it was con-
tended that plaintiff was contributory 
negligent as matter of law in not seeing 
and avoiding effects of defendant's negli-
gence, if plaintiff was negligent in failing 
to keep look out, whether such failure 
to observe proximately caused collision was 
question for jury. 
McCullough, Boyce & McCullough, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Ray R. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
As Lynn \V. Martin was driving south 
along 18th East through its intersection 
writh Stratford Avenue, the defendant com-
ing along Stratford Avenue from the 
east, crashed into the middle of the left 
side of his car causing personal injury to 
plaintiff and damaging his automobile. At 
the trial, after plaintiff had presented all 
of his evidence, defendant moved for a 
dismissal upon several grounds, among 
which were: 
"i4» The plaintiff's evidence * * * 
show;- the plaintiff to have been guilty 
3. II»^> v. KobmMm. lot* I tan r,u, 103 lVJd 
of contributory negligence which Aa> 
a substantial proximate cause of the 
accident." 
upon which ground the motion was grant ! 
Under the new Rules of Civil Procu\:r" 
41(b), unless the court otherwise specific-
such a dismissal is with prejudice and i= a 
final judgment. The plaintiff assigns ti •: 
ruling as error. 
The sole question presented by plaintiff-
appeal is whether he is prevented from re-
covering because he was guilty of ncrh-
gence which proximately contributed tu 
cause his own injury. 
[1] In appraising the dismissal wine'-
was granted against the plaintiff, he i* en-
titled to have us review all of the evidenc , 
together with even- logical inference wire1, 
may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to him. 
Plaintiff left his home in Salt Lake Cit} 
at about 7:00 a. m. on September 25, l ° : n . 
and drove south along 18th East approach-
ing its intersection with Stratford A\UUIL, 
upon which defendant was approaching th-. 
intersection from the east. The weaP-" 
and visibility were good and the roads dry. 
Xo traffic signals or signs control train** 
there. The northeast corner of the inter-
section, across which these travellers wmiM 
see each other, is blind in that there i-c 
a high fence along the west property line 
and there are vines, bushes and trees wric': 
obscure the view. The width of aspha : 
surface of 18th East is 26 feet; of Strat-
ford Avenue 2S feet. 
Plaintiff said he was travelling 10 to 1-
miles per hour, slowing down as he ap-
proached the intersection. He first louku* 
to the west, then to the east from whence 
defendant would have been approaching 
At this instant he was approximately -1 
feet from the intersection and he could see 
150 to 3)0 feet eastwa rd but saw no car 
coming from that direction. Lie apparently 
assumed from this observation that there 
was no car coming from the east close 
enough to constitute any hazard to hiri. 
turned his attention back to the intersection 
and the west and proceeded. He first s^u' 
:>!<>; Louder v. Holluy. Utah, 233 IVJd :U>. 
MARTIN v 
Cite as 2-i 
.jeundant'b car at a point about oO feet 
c i-i ot the intersection when he heard 
screeching1 as defendant's brakes were ap-
. iiul. Plaintiff applied his own brakes and 
\,A- -tt-pped, or virtually so, a little to the 
.ourh oi the center of the intersection when 
be was struck. The left front fender and 
V'KL! of the defendant's car hit the front 
• „^t of the left front door of plaintiff's 
t l lr. The crabh knocked plaintiff uncon-
y-,ii[s and his automobile must have re-
r- tnied in gear as it traveled a total di*-
- j'cr of 15o feet, flr-t going on south and 
. .o '-K and then \ o ring more to the west, 
r i^.ni: two front >ards and a hedge before 
: • / ! / coming to re-t. Defendant's auto-
-(/'lle came to rest about IS feet south of 
• , pnmt of impact. His skid marks ex-
» '<[(<: east from that point a distance of 
-7 »o 6: feet, and indicated that as he hit 
i-it'tf hi« car was about its width (lacked 
j_"> si tilth of the center line of Stratford 
\ i nno. 
TKre was testimony by Officer Kenneth 
«" I\irn^\\orth that, if the defendant's 
' >rr« h\le had come to a complete stop 
;:er -kidding the 57 feet, his speed would 
••i\e been 52 miles, or more, per hour. 
.V:; momentum left after the skid would 
r.present additional speed. It must have 
• Kcceded the 32 miles per hour considerably 
c mse oi the force with which the plam-
• -fs car was struck (it wras damaged so 
i iU that it could only be sold for salvage) 
i al^o because the 57 feet represented 
- r'y the actual skid after the reaction time 
-id passed and the brake was applied. It 
•°g a residential area, the admitted 
i limit is 25 miles per hour. 
r2] From the forgoing facts concerning 
-*• JU. and considering the defendant's duty 
• > kt t j> a proper lookout, to keep his car 
•:• i< r safe control and on his right side 
• the street, and the matter of yielding the 
r ^ t of way hereinafter discussed, it is 
"i. -tioned that the jury could have found 
•" ueghgent. 
**\\- then proceed to the inquiry: Can it 
-ail as a matter of law that the plain-
'•VCIN gmlty of contributory negligence 
~h proximately contributed to cause his 
' :: jurv? 
STEVENS Utah
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[3] The question of contributory negli-
gence is usually for the jury and the court 
should be reluctant to take consideration 
of this question ot fact from it. XieKun v. 
Mauchley, Utah, 202 P.Zd 547; Toomer'* 
Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Utah, 
239 P.2d 163. The expressions in those 
cases are in accord with this uniformly 
accepted doctrine. The right to trial by 
jury should be safeguarded. Before the 
issue of contributory negligence may be 
taken from the jury, the defendant's burden 
of proving- both fa) that plaintiff wa< 
guilty of contributory negligence, and (b) 
that such negligence proximately con-
tributed to cause his own iniur\, miM be 
met, and established with such certainty 
that reasonable minds cord 1 not find to the 
contrary; conversely, if there is any rea-
sonable basis, either because of lack of 
evidence, or from the evidence and the fair 
inferences arising therefrom, taken in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which 
reasonable minds may conclude that they 
are not convinced by a preponderance of 
the evidence either (a) that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence or (b) 
that such negligence proximately contribut-
ed to cause the injury, the plaintiff is en-
titled to have the question submitted to a 
jury. 
The defendant makes some far-reaching 
contentions respecting the law of this state 
governing traffic at intersections. The 
doctrine he contends for, reduced to its bare 
substance is this: That an intersection col-
lision will not occur unless both of the 
drivers are negligent and fail to see each 
other, or having seen one another, attempt 
to win a race to the intersection. He 
maintains virtually that no matter how-
negligent the defendant may be it is still 
the plaintiff's duty to avoid the collision. 
He states in his brief: ''And if the defend-
ant were travelling 50 miles per hour, that 
would have been fair notice to the plaintiff 
that the defendant had no intention of 
yielding the right of way." and further: 
"The rule that both drivers involved in an 
intersection collision are guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law is a health} rule 
and conforms to the realities of modern day 
driving conditions." 
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These contentions of the defendant are 
fallacious. The law has never been so 
declared by this court. Concurring in the 
case of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 
P.2d 350, 354, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe said: 
" * * * we must be careful not to 
stretch contributory negligence to the point 
where we make it incumbent upon one not 
only to drive carefully himself, but to drive 
so carefully as always to be prepared for 
some sudden burst of negligence of another 
and be able to avoid it. * * * " The 
substance of that thought has been ex-
pressed numerous times in the intersection 
c: ••••s re'icd imon by the defendant. The 
rule he contends for would throw a protec-
tive cloak over wrongdoers and penalize 
careful drivers by requiring them to an-
ticipate and avoid the negligence of others. 
If a driver has to drive his car under the 
assumption that every one else is apt to 
be negligent, the next step would be for him 
to conclude that he better get off the streets 
entirely or some one is likely to hit him, 
and abandon the streets to those who were 
just willing to take chances. If, under 
circumstances such as present in this case, 
where the plaintiffs right of way is so clear 
that no reasonable person could have any 
doubt about it, he could not assume that he 
would be afforded his right of way, the only 
way drivers could safely proceed at an in-
tersection would be to resort to: "You first, 
my dear Gaston,—no, after you, my dear 
Alphonsc/' procedure or get out and hold 
a conference before either could safely pro-
ceed. 
Such a state of uncertainty and confusion 
would not be consistent with the purpose of 
the law, which is to so regulate traffic as to 
permit the most efficient and expeditious 
use of the streets consistent with safety. 
It is true indeed that safety is the first and 
most important consideration and that care-
ful driving is to be encouraged to the ut-
most possible degree. However, it does not 
follow that it is necessary to so interpret 
the law that, wherever there is a collision 
at an intersection, both drivers are guilty 
of negligence, nor that in a case such as this 
the plaintiff should be precluded from re-
covery because by hindsight it may appear 
that by using some extraordinary degree of 
caution and circumspection, he could ha\e 
observed that the defendant was being negli-
gent and thus have afforded the defenda:.; 
the use of the intersection and avoided the 
collision. 
[4] It was for the very purpose o: 
avoiding uncertainty and confusion at in-
tersections, and in order to make the move-
ment of traffic both practical and safe, that 
rules have been established so that drive": 
will know which has the right of way. A:. 
excellent text statement of the rights ai:: 
duties of drivers at intersections is con-
tained in 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., § C/A 
to 994 inc., pp. 206 et seq. The first o: 
these rules is that the vehicle which enter? 
the crossing first has the right of way over 
a second one coming from another direc-
tion, unless under the standard of due care, 
he should not proceed because to do so 
would hazard a collision. In close case-, 
this test is somewhat unsatisfactory because 
oi the difficulties, after a collision has oc-
curred, of determining who had the rig-* 
of way on that basis. The text just refer-
red to correctly states : " * * * The mere 
fact of reaching the intersection first is r." 
longer recognized as the sole test as to vo<o 
has the right of way." In order for a 
driver to claim the right of way on i — 
basis of entering the intersection first. •* 
must appear that he did not speed up ju-*-
for the purpose of claiming the right <•' 
way, and also that the margin or distand-
by which he claimed it was so clear as to :••«• 
without doubt. 
The second rule is easier to apply *'•'•'-
therefore more satisfactory, that is: Vv--
vehicles are approaching and about to e i^ 
the intersection at substantially the sa:-'-
time, the driver approaching from the n -
has the right of way over the one approach-
ing from his left. The same text s-}"-
'This rule has been called the basic !-'•• 
governing operation of vehicles at stf^1-
intersections.'' Necessity dictates that *-z-' 
rule govern unless one vehicle is enn!:- • 
ahead of the other in entering- the in'*-'-* 
section to assure him a clear wjriiw L 
safety. 
[5] By both of these rules plaintiff *-•• 
the right of way. He approached -'•'-' 
Cite as 2 I 
entered the intersection so far ahead of 
• e:\ndaiit that no doubt could arise as to 
A inch had the right of way on that basi^; 
t \ e u if doubt had arisen, then that is the 
very circumstance in which the rule of the 
driver approaching from the right governs. 
ylimtii'l aLso had the r ight of way on that 
ground. 
[6] Defendant argues that , conceding 
the plaintiff's right of way and that the 
defendant was negligent, yet plaintiff was 
guilty oi contr ibutory neghgence as a 
matter of law for not seeing and avoiding 
the effects of defendant 's negligence. In 
support of his position he c i tes : Bullock v. 
Luke, supra ; Sine v. Salt Lake Transpor ta -
tion Co., 106 Utah 280, 147 P.2d X75; 
Ilickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 
514; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 103 
P.2d 437; and Cren v. Nor ton , Utah, 213 
P.2d 356. as cases where a driver was held 
guilty of contr ibutory negligence as a mat-
ter of law for failing to observe and avoid 
collision with another oncoming driver un-
der circumstances where the other d r h e r 
may have been, or was, guilty of negligence 
in his approach. In order to avoid burden-
ing this opinion with a repetition and 
analysis of each of these cases, one prin-
ciple which distinguishes them from the 
case at bar can be succinctly s ta ted: Each 
oi them was decided upon the proposition 
that the circumstances were such that the 
driver held to be negligent as a matter of 
law, either observed, or in the exercise of 
due care should have observed, the manner 
in which the other dr iver was approaching 
the intersection and clearly could by ordi-
nary reasonable care have avoided the col-
lision. O r to state it in other words, the 
negligence, o r manner of driving, of the 
other dr iver was such tha t the driver ap-
praising the situation was alerted to it or 
by using due care would have been so 
alerted in t ime so that by the exercise of 
ordinary precaut ion he could have avoided 
the collision. And, in each of these cases, 
this seemed to the court so clearly manifest 
that reasonable minds could not find to the 
contrary. 
The re has been and still is much dis-
cussion and disagreement as to whether 
the various fact si tuations in those cases 
MARTIN v. STEVENS 
3 P.2d 717 
Utah 751 
come under the foregoing rule. Put there 
is no disagreement about the rule. If as 
s t . iud by .Mr. Chief Just ice Wolfe ::i hii 
concurr ing opinion, the facts of l l ickuk v. 
Skinner, supra, do not b r ing it within the 
principle above stated, it was wrongly 
decided, and is hereby overruled. Those 
cases do not purport to lay down any other 
s tandard than that of o rd inary reasonable 
care. Xo mat ter how far afield one r\.y go 
in reviewing, analyzing and rationalizing 
the decisions in the^e intersection cases, 
he must always come back to the one basic 
concept which underlies and controls the 
Law of T o r t s : the conduct of the mythical 
but extremely useful "ord inary reasonable 
prudent man under the circumstances", all 
of which is encompassed in the shorter 
phrase ' 'due care" . 
[7] Tha t is the s tandard we apply to 
the plaintiff. Admittedly, the right of way 
is not absolute. One who has it, under one 
or both of the aforement ioned rules may 
not, with foolhardy assurance , claim the 
r ight of way in the face of a danger which 
one exercising due care would see and 
avoid. Although plaintiff had the right of 
way under both rules above referred to, yet 
there devolved upon him the duty of due 
care in observing for other traffic. But in 
doing so he had the right to assume, and to 
rely and act on the assumption that others 
would do l ikewise; he was not obliged to 
anticipate either that other drivers would 
dr ive negligently, nor fail to accord him 
his r ight of way, until in the exercise of 
due care, he observed, or should have ob-
served, something to warn him that the 
other driver was dr iving negligently or 
would fail to accord him his r ight of way. 
If this principle is not clear in the earlier 
Utah cases, it is firmly established by the 
more recent expressions of this court. 
A case which illustrates the matter very 
well is that of Hess v. Robinson, 10° Utah 
60, 163 P.2d 510, where the plaintiff, driving 
southward along a th rough street, failed 
to see defendant 's ambulance coming into 
the intersection from the west. It was held 
that even though plaintiff was negligent in 
not seeing the ambulance, the question as to 
wdiether his negligence proximately con-
tr ibuted to cause his injury was properly 
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submitted to the jury. (Three members of 
the court, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe and Mr. 
Justice Wade and Mr. Justice McDonough 
indicated that both were jury questions/) 
The main opinion reasoned that if he had 
seen the ambulance, the jury could find it to 
be within his duty of due care to assume 
that it would obey the stop sign, and that 
he was entitled to proceed through the 
intersection until it became apparent to him 
that the ambulance would not stop. 
In the later case of Lowder v. Holley, 
Utah, 25$ P.2d 350, the plaintiff failed to 
observe the defendant's vehicle approach-
ing from the right. There was evidence 
from which it could be found that at the 
time the plaintiff was about ready to enter 
the intersection the defendant was 250 
feet away. It was held that the question 
whether plaintiff's failure to see defendant's 
approach was negligence was a question of 
fact. It was also observed that had he 
seen defendant it could be found to be 
within his duty of due care to assume that 
the defendant would yield him the right of 
way. 
The governing principles in the very 
recent case of Poulsen v. Manness, Utah, 
241 P.2d 152, are identical to the instant 
case. The plaintiff stopped at the inter-
section, looked to the east where he could 
see about 400 feet, assumed there was no 
traffic constituting a hazard from that 
direction, looked back to the west and pro-
ceeded on into the intersection where he 
was struck. The question of whether his 
failure to look again to the east constituted 
negligence and also whether such negli-
gence proximately contributed to cause the 
collision were held to have been properly 
submitted to the jury. For other Utah 
cases in accord with the holdings of the 
cases discussed above see Ilardmau v. Thur-
man, Utah, 239 P.2d 215; Xielson v. 
Mauchley, supra. 
[8] We revert briefly to plaintiff's evi-
dence. As he was about 20 feet north of 
the intersection, he looked cast, then back-
to the west and didn't see defendant until 
the latter set his brakes just before the 
impact. This testimony should be inter-
preted in the light of well known facts con-
cerning a person's ability to see. The 
anahsis of this ca^e in the brief> proceed-
upon a fallacy which is common in the t r : / 
and determination oi facts in lawsuit* « f 
this type: That is, it seems to be a-sunud 
that human vision projects as through a 
tunnel to the point of main focus seui.i; 
practically nothing else. Ignored is th 
fact that the sight is diffused, that is, the 
normal field, or angle of vision (the width 
of area one can see to either side of h> 
direct line of vision) is quite wide, in fact 
about 180°. This is quickly and easi!) 
demonstrated by placing one's fincer back 
of his line of vision, say back of his ear, 
a few inches out from the head and bring-
ing it gradually forward. The e>e ui'l 
perceive it about as it gets up even with 
the eye. With this breadth of vision, al-
though plaintiff withdrew his attention 
from the east back toward the intersection 
and to the south and west, it seems likely 
that he would have been aware, out of the 
"corner of his eye" so to speak, of the ap-
proach of the Stevens' car. However, the 
jury could believe that he did not see it a: 
all until it was 57 feet from the impact, 
or it may have assumed that what he meant 
by saying he didn't see it until that time 
was that his attention and direct vision. 
were then first focused upon defendart. 
Whichever view is taken, under the lav.* 
as we view* it, a jury question as to due 
care on plaintiffs part was presented. 
We must remember that there were three 
other streets to give some attention to a-
he approached the intersection. All of tin-
attention could not very well or safely i •-
focused on any one at any gi\en in>ta'* 
Remaining aware of the others and iri"* •'<-
them secondary attention, the n'.tint: . 
would look to the west, as he said he d:«'. 
to observe for the favored traffic to whicn 
he must give right of way, if any was near. 
He then looked to the east and saw no ca"* 
within the extent of his vision, 15»> to 3'° 
feet. At that instant he was entitled to 
assume, absent am thing to warn him to tin 
contrary, that am car approaching fn,::1 
that direction would do so at a lawful ra^ 
of speed, that is. not to exceed about ~-"* 
miles per hour. He then changed his ma:^ 
On* a* J l 
. ^ • / : o i i back to the intt r uc t i on and the 
•h .tiid 'V' t^ Mid proceeded. 
].v,,m that point, 3* feet north of the in-
., a c t i o n , where pLuiti tf made bib observa-
.,Ml. t<> the ea^t, he would h a \ e to travel 
l() a 5'> to 55 feet to get past the center 
i ( : the intersection and thus be clear of any 
, ( abound traffic. At 15 miles per hour, 
( r 22 feet per second, this would take him 
w'-.jhtly less than 3 seconds. Assuming that 
r-, wc<bound traffic would be t ravel ing 
. ::'.>m the speed limits of 25 miles per hour, 
,
 r / o feet per Second, the plaintiff would 
;-;,;C had time to pass clear of any car 
" a greater distance than lf'S feet to the 
u i . t . ' 3 Sec. x 3o') The evidence is tha t 
,; i \nd.mt was at least 150 feet away and 
the jury could find more than 200 feet. 
A^ hereinabove suggested, we must avoid 
measuring the plaintiff's duty and charg ing 
him with negligence because he may have 
failed to anticipate and avert negligence on 
the part of the defendant. W e do not be-
j . ;^e that it can be said that all reasonable 
jTimcls must agree that the plaintiff's action 
in looking to the east and then proceeding, 
r e h i n g on his right of way over traffic from 
that direction, and the assumption that any 
such traffic would not exceed a reasonable 
and lawful rate of speed, amounted to 
negligence on his part . 
[9] There is also the question of p rox-
imate cause. Should we assume that all 
reasonable men must conclude that plain-
tiff's fai lure to keep more of a lookout to 
the east amounted to negligence, would 
they also all agree that such failure to ob-
serve proximately caused the collision? 
Supi use he had looked continuously to the 
ui>t as he approached and proceeded into 
the intersection and had seen defendant 
coming. Could he not, within the limits of 
reasonable care, have assumed defendant 
world slow up and yield the right of way, 
or \vonld the defendant 's speed and p rox-
imity to the intersection have been a w a r n -
ing to the plaintiff that he would not do so? 
Under the rulings in Hess v. Robinson ; 
Lowdcr v. Holley; and Pou'sen v. Manness , 
all cited above, this was also a ju ry ques-
tion. 
Cause is reversed and remanded. Costs 
to appellant. 
243 P.2d—43 
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r J.I r i : 
W A D E , McPO.VOUU.II, and I I E X -
R I u D , }]., concur. 
W O L F E , Chief Justice (concurring in 
the resul t ; . 
I concur in the result and in tha t par t 
of the reasoning supporting the result which 
I set out as follows: that the plaintiff 
had the r ight oi w a y ; that at least for the 
purposes of determining the defendant ' s 
r ight to dismissal the defendant must be 
t rea ted as having been negligent in t r ave r s -
ing the approach to the intersection at an 
excessive speed; that it was clearly a j u ry 
question whether under all the circum-
stances the plaintiff was guilty of contr ibu-
tory negl igence; and that there is evi-
dence from which a jury could find that he 
was not so guilty. This much supports the 
decision for reversal and I rest my concur-
rence on it. By this, I do not wish it to be 
implied that I do not agree with the state-
ments made by Mr. Justice Crockett in the 
rat ionale by which he reaches the result. 
T h e opinion shows evidence of a commend-
able at tempt to find common principles 
govern ing our intersection decisions. In 
many and perhaps most of those s ta tements 
I can agree . In others, I cannot. But I 
th ink it a work of supererogation for me to 
discuss each one separately and cast myself 
in the role of a critic as to them. I am 
inclined to the view that the wri ter of the 
opinion in his attempt to br ing all the inter-
section cases under common principles was 
on solid ground so long as he did not go 
beyond the broad principle that each dr iver 
must exercise due care under all the cir-
cumstances surrounding his t raversal of the 
in tersec t ion; as to more refined principles, 
intersection cases will vary with the cir-
cumstances. I cannot agree that Hickok v. 
Skinner , 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 514, may be 
justified on the theory that the driver who 
had the r ight of way in that case was 
negligent as a mat ter of law because he 
"observed, or in the exercise of due care 
should hai'e observed, the manner in which 
the other dr iver was approaching the inter-
section and clearly could by o rd inary 
reasonable care have avoided the collision." 
1 Emphasis added.) This statement begs 
the question. T h e very th ing complained 
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about in that case is that the driver who 
unquestionably had the right of way, was 
held to be negligent in failing to reap-
praise the situation. He was not given the 
benefit of the preference the law accorded 
him nor of the presumption which the law 
should indulge him, viz. that the non-pre-
ferred driver would slow down in def-
erence to his right. It appears to me that 
those elements should have gone to the jury 
to determine if under all the circumstances 
the driver who was in law held guilty of 
contributory negligence, was in fact so 
guilty. 
I do not think in the Hickok case it 
could be said as a matter of law that under 
the circumstances Hickok was negligent in 
proceeding under his right of way and that 
he should have been or was alerted to the 
fact that the other party would not sur-
render it to him. 
In that case the facts are not such as to 
justify the statement that "the negligence, 
or manner of driving, of the other driver 
was such that the driver appraising the 
situation was alerted to it, or by using due 
care would have been so alerted in time so 
that by the exercise of ordinary precaution 
he could have avoided the collision." 
Whether that was so should have been left 
to the jury. For the lower court or this 
court to take upon itself the function of 
saying that the favored driver was negli-
gent unless no reasonable mind could say 
otherwise, simply reintroduces the element 
of requiring the preferred driver to drive 
so as to avoid the negligence of the dis-
favored driver which both Mr. Justice 
Crockett and I have given warnings against. 
Or it introduces a pseudo last clear chance 
doctrine. 
I appreciate the brave effort of Mr. 
Justice Crockett in trying to explain the 
Hickok case and in attempting to bring it 
under a common category but it requires a 
perversion of the facts to do so. That case 
should have gone to the jury. As long as it 
holds the sway of authority, counsel for 
this defendant and other defendants may 
justifiably contend for what Mr. Justice 
Crockett states is counsel's contention here-
in, to wit, that virtually no matter how 
negligent the defendant may be it is still 
the plaintiffs duty to avoid the colhsior, 
a length to which, however, I do not thn \ 
the attorney for defendant really goes 
Of cou^e, I do not agree with the conten-
tion of the defendant in this case that "if 
the defendant were traveling 50 miles per 
hour, that would have been fair notice tu 
the plaintiff that the defendant had no in-
tention oi yielding the right of was " 
Certainly if the plaintiff did have that "fa1" 
notice" and had time to stop and did no', 
the jury could under proper instruction^. 
have found the plaintiff guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. But the jury would ha\e 
also had before it the fact that when he 
timely looked east he did not see any car 
coming west (toward him) within a dis-
tance of 150 to 200 feet; that he saw de-
fendant's car for the first time when it \va« 
60 feet from him and he was then alertc: 
by the screech of its brakes; and the jur\ 
would determine whether this was "fair 
notice" under those circumstances. The 
fact seems to be that the defendant countc 1 
himself one of those lucky chaps who could 
speed into intersections and meet no cars. 
There are minds which appear to operate 
that way. 
Perhaps in the Hickok case, a reappraise 
merit of the situation if it had been made at 
the right moment would have alerted th-
favored driver to the fact that the dis-
favored driver was not going to yield t <-
right of way and perhaps given him time :•; 
avoid the collision. I say "at the nc%: 
moment" because a moment sooner thu'. 
that "right moment" the driver of the fav«r 
ed car might still have thought the oth'r 
driver would slow down to let him p-- ' 
whilst a moment later than that "right m • 
ment" it would have been too late to avo -
the collision. This points up, I think, trc 
duty we put upon the favored driver i"* 
those cases. The disfavored driver ha* 
the duty to slow down; and while tr.* 
favored driver cannot totally ignore t.-
other and blindly traverse the intersection. 
he can, until he is otherwise put on noti-e-
presume that the disfavored driver ^v:" 
slow down and permit him to pass, but it ' 
for the jury to determine whether unf-<-
all the circumstances the favored drf>' 
could indulge in the presumption tmu <• " 
MARTIN v, 
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(;-\favored driver would yield him the right 
(.: ^<\v an '^ under the circumstances, the 
u-t itrnc it should give that presumption, if 
i<n\. It is just these factors winch make 
•- a jury question. In the case of Farrell 
Vp Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 P.2d I0o>\ this 
court held that a driver who notes that a 
•ur approaching from the opposite direction 
loo feet away is 12 to 16 inches over the 
center line of the highway is negMg^nt as 
Iv matter of law if he fails to then turn his 
c tr to the right to an extent which will 
:> jow the cars to pass if the oncoming car 
r, mains ovu the center line, provided that 
T':tre i^> sufficient space to the right in which 
• ,j turn and time for the driver to do so. 
l:\ a dissenting opinion I contended that the 
duty of the driver to move to the right 
ordinarily would not arise immediately upon 
seeing t n e approaching car on the wrong 
s:Je of the highway, but that the duty to 
move to the right arose only when the 
driver had notice or reasonably should 
have taken notice that the approaching car 
did not intend to timely retreat to its own 
side of the highway. Until such time, how-
ever, I argued that the driver could assume 
that the approaching car would observe the 
law of the road and seasonably move to its 
proper side of the highway so as to pass 
without interference. In that case we did 
not have the benefit of a transcript of the 
testimony adduced at the trial but had be-
fore us only the findings of the trial court. 
I thought that there was nothing in the 
findings of fact which would warrant us in 
concluding as a matter of law that when 
the approaching car was 100 feet away, the 
time had arrived when the driver of the 
other car knew or should have reasonably 
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known that the oncoming car did not intend 
to move over to its own side of the highway. 
Somewhat the same principle applies in 
man\ of the intersection cases and, as Mr. 
Justice Crockett suggests, especially in 
those intersection cases where both drivers 
are visible to each other throughout their 
approach and traverse of the intersections. 
I think my only difference with him is that 
in the Hickok case the question of whether 
the circumstances were such that the favor-
ed driver should or could have noticed that 
the other (disfavored) driver was not going 
to yield his right of way was for the jury. 
It was not a case for a pronouncement by 
this court of negligence in law on the part 
of the favored driver. Xo attempt should 
be made at this time to distinguish the 
Hickok case. It should be expressly over-
ruled or left to die of inanition. 
As to Lowder v. Holley, Utah, 233 P.2d 
350, I stated in my concurrence the ground 
on which I placed it. Likewise in Poulsen 
v. Manness, Utah, 241 P.2d 152, I did the 
same thing. I must refer the reader to 
those two cases for the factors which I 
thought distinguished them from Hickok v. 
Skinner, supra, and Conklin v. Walsh, 113 
Utah 276, 193 P.2d 437. Those concur-
rences included other general observations 
which I made in this segment of the law 
which I think are in general accordance 
with Mr. Justice Crockett's opinion in this 
case. However, I shall not guarantee that, 
but there is no necessity or aid in going into 
those concurrences. They speak for them-
selves. 
For the above reasons I can concur only 
in the results. 
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